It took quite a considerable amount of time for the Security Council to react to the brutal nature of abuses in Libya. The people of Libya had voice fully called for intervention in the attacks colonel Gaddafi had orchestrated against his own population.
Western decision making in the past decades has come under scrutiny and public ridicule in the Arab world. Immediately the crisis started, I wondered what the strategy would be to convince a questioning and suspicious Arab audience. Never before in the past decade has such an opportunity avail itself for Western allies to utilize a strategic and constructive plan to change the minds and hearts of the oppress, however, it took weeks before a concerted effort was approved by the security council for the implementation of a no fly zone in Libya. Under UN resolution 1979 a open clear optimistic door went open for the use of public diplomacy to convince Arab audiences, that Western allies would protect sovereignty and dispose tyrannical rule if only accepted by the masses. The resolution read: ‘Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’. Furthermore, a strong analytical critique was approved in the justification of implementing a no fly zone, ‘determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
A comprehensive ground work had been envisaged in context with the Security Council approval under the UN’s VII chapter to use force, stating clearly to Arab audiences that: The International community did not seek invasion or occupation. American and European reluctance to start a ground war illustrated a perfect picture of non - westernization of the conflict, however, ignoring the suffering of the population tinted the new short lived ‘positive’ image of the West.
The structural strategy of NATO forces not to align with ‘the rebels’ also came as disappointment to Arab audiences as the civilian toll and rise of internally displaced persons (IDPs) threatened to cause humanitarian crisis. NATO forces have also constantly struck ‘rebel’ fighters in ‘friendly fires’ but refuse to apologise: ‘alliance commander Rear Admiral Russell Harding spoke merely of his “regrets” at the loss of life. And he blamed the blunder on not knowing anti-Gaddafi forces had tanks, believing the vehicles were government ones. He said bluntly: “I am not apologizing’.
The act of ignorance and unwillingness to admit mistakes to appease an expectant faction (The Arab Constituent) is indeed a lost opportunity in the failings of NATO public diplomacy in an era of strategic advantage.
Bibliography: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12782972
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